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The eight United States Naval Shipyards commenced opera-
tion under the rate stabilization concept in 1976. Rate sta-
bilization refers to the use of annually predetermined rates
for the billing of customers for work accomplished in the
shipyard. A primary objective of rate stabilization was to
provide improved planning and budgeting to the customer and
the shipyard.
The objective of this thesis was to assess the impact of
rate stabilization on the U. S. Naval Shipyards.
Conclusions are that the overall operational, planning
and programming advantages provided by rate stabilization
more than offset the disadvantages. Indications are that
the concept of rate stabilization is working and that the
shipyards are learning to work within the program. It is
important that, once stabilized rates have been set, major
changes in workload at the individual shipyards do not occur.
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United States Naval Shipyards exist to provide support in
the form of overhauls, repairs, alterations and modernizations
to the operating fleet. In this capacity, they operate as big
business with the eight naval shipyards achieving gross sales
of $1.8 billion in Fiscal Year 1977. This represents approx-
imately five percent of the Navy budget for that year, a figure
comparable to previous years and truly a significant amount.
This thesis addresses itself to the impact of stabilized
rates on operations at the U. S. Naval Shipyards. Rate stabil-
ization refers to the use of predetermined rates for the billing
of customers for work accomplished in the shipyard. The rates
are established on an annual basis and, once approved, can be
changed only with great difficulty at the Department of Defense
level. This is a significant change from past operations where
the rates used to charge customers could be, and frequently
were, adjusted periodically during the year. It is important
to note that these rates are established as much as eighteen
months prior to the time that they actually become effective
and thus require a considerable amount of planning and fore-
casting. Naval shipyards have been operating with stabilized
rates for several years now, thus affording the opportunity to




The objective of this thesis is to assess the impact of
rate stabilization on U. S. Naval Shipyards. In order to ac-
complish this objective, the following specific areas were
researched:
1. A review of the Navy Industrial Fund at the naval ship-
yards and a determination as to why the use of stabilized rates
became a necessity.
2. A determination of how the policy of stabilized rates
is presently operating in the shipyards.
3. An analysis of the impact of rate stabilization on the
operation of the shipyards.
C. APPROACH
The approach used in this thesis included a review of
current articles, books and government documents pertaining to
the Navy Industrial Fund and rate stabilization; an extensive
personal interview with the Controller at the Mare Island Naval
Shipyard; and telephone interviews with personnel at other
Naval Shipyards, at the Navy Comptroller's Office, Washington,
D. C, and at the Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D. C.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
To gain an understanding of the impact of rate stabilization
on the shipyards, one must first obtain an understanding of the
environment in which this procedure has been implemented. A
9

brief look at the Navy Industrial Fund and at rate stabilization,
itself, is therefore in order.
B. THE NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND (NIF)
The Navy Industrial Fund is one of several industrial funds
operating within the Department of Defense. It was established
with the intent of improving management capability over the
large amount of resources involved in the operation of the ship-
yards. The Navy Industrial Fund, authorized under the provi-
sions of 10 U. S. Code 2208, provides a means of financing work
to be accomplished through a revolving fund. The fund is then
replenished by the customer upon completion of the job (Hef. 1).
The goal of the fund is to recover all costs without generating
a profit or incurring a loss and to reduce the impact of the
annual appropriations cycle on the shipyard operation.
Guidance in the operation of the NIF at naval shipyards is
provided by several sources; among them the Navy Comptroller
Manual, Vol. 3 (Ref. 2), The Navy Industrial Fund Handbook for
Naval Shipyards (Ref. 3), The Navy Industrial Fund Financial
Management Guide (Ref. I;), and DOD Instruction 7^10. I4., "Regula-
tions Governing Industrial Fund Operation" (Ref. 5)»
DOD Instruction 7^4-10 .L|. delineates the following objectives
for industrial funds
:
1. Provide a more effective means for controlling the
costs of goods and services required to be produced or
furnished by industrial and commercial type activities,
and a more effective and flexible means for financing,
budgeting and accounting for the costs thereof;
10

2. Create and recognize contractual relationships between
industrial and commercial-type activities and those
activities which budget for and order the end-product
or services in order to provide management advantages
and incentives for efficiency and economy;
3. Provide to managers of commercial and industrial type
activities the financial authority and flexibility re-
quired to procure and use manpower, materials and
other resources effectively;
l±. Encouraging cross-servicing among the military depart-
ments and among their operating agencies, with the aim
of obtaining more economical use of facilities;
5. Support the performance budgeting concept by facili-
tating budgeting and reporting for the costs of end
products, and thus underlining the cost consequences
of decision making, including choices between alterna-
tives in such terms. (Ref. 5)
The first, third and fifth objectives above are particularly
germain to this thesis.
Navy Industrial Fund operation at the naval shipyards is,
indeed, big business. At the end of Fiscal Year f 78, the
annual sales of the eight shipyards amounted to $1,9814- » 897*000,
sufficient to rank in the top two hundred firms of private in-
dustry. Table 1 provides a listing of the naval shipyards
with their annual sales and employment figures. Of the work
performed in the shipyards, approximately 85% involves the
overhaul, repair and modernization of ships. The remaining
15% consists of repairs and manufacturing of parts for the Navy
Ships Parts Control Center and work accomplished for tenant
activities and other customers (Ref. 6). One has only to look
at the number of employees involved and the volume of dollars
passing through the shipyards to realize the significance of




Gross Business/Employment of the Naval
Shipyards in FY '78 ($000) (Ref. 6)
SHIPYARD GROSS BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT
Norfolk $ 308,696 11,306
Mare Island 299,671; 9,500
Puget Sound 297,381; 10,500
Long Beach 239,121 7,301;
Philadelphia 233,202 7,970
Charleston 21 9,h2k 7,680
Pearl Harbor 195,359 6,127
Portsmouth 192,037 7,1;75
TOTAL $ 1,981;, 897 67,862
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At this point in the study, it seems appropriate to cover,
in not great detail, the operation of the NIF at the shipyard.
The following paragraphs will describe the operation of the NIP
as well as some of the procedures and systems utilized.
1 • Operation
Each shipyard conducts its operations through the use
of a revolving fund, referred to as the "corpus". Operating
expenses generated during the performance of the assigned work
are paid for out of the corpus. Upon completion of the work,
the customer is billed and the corpus reimbursed. Alternately,
progress payments may be utilized to restore the corpus while
work is in progress.
The basis upon which work is performed in the shipyard
is normally a project order which describes the work in detail.
The rates to be applied to the work are the stabilized rates,
stabilized in that they are established prior to, and remain
in effect throughout, the fiscal year. In the case of the
shipyard, the approved stabilized rates will be used to bill
overhaul, repair and alteration starts throughout the entire
period of the order, regardless of the number of fiscal years
involved (Ref. 7).
2. Billing and Collection
There are three methods by which customers may be
billed: (1) fixed price, (2) cost-reimbursable and (3) pre-
determined rates (Ref. 8). The last are, quite simply, rates




The shipyard has two options available to it within
the fixed-price method. It can offer a fixed rate to the
customer prior to commencing any of the projected work or it
can offer a fixed rate to the customer at any time before $0%
of the work is completed. Obviously, the shipyard must have
a very accurate projection of the work requirements prior to
making a fixed-price offer. The amount of the fixed-price
offer, however, must be determined utilizing the stabilized
rates which the yard has published (Ref. 7)« Irregardless of
actual costs, once a fixed-price contract has been agreed upon,
that is the only amount which the shipyard can bill the cus-
tomer. If a fixed-price contract can be reached, this provides
a significant benefit to the customer from the standpoint of
planning the overhaul. Likewise, it can work to the advantage,
or disadvantage, of the shipyard depending on their efficiency
in completing the contract. Any changes to the overhaul pack-
age must be negotiated into the contract prior to acceptance.
The cost-reimbursable method will be utilized when the
project order does not sufficiently define the work require-
ments or if the customer feels that the fixed price offer is
too high. In this situation, the customer is billed for the
costs incurred by the shipyard utilizing the established stabil-
ized rates plus the cost of material used.
Billing is accomplished on a DD Form 1080 which is sub-
mitted to the nearest Navy Regional Pinanance Center. The DD
1080 becomes a voucher which the Navy Regional Finance Center
114-

utilizes to debit the shipyard NIP corpus and credit the
customer^ appropriation.
3. Accounting
NIP activities utilize a cost accounting system with
cost centers and job orders being the key elements in the
system. Each cost center has three important characteristics:
a. Each cost center consists of a natural grouping
of men, machines, methods, processes, operations;
b. Each cost center is made up of elements having
common '.cost characteristics;
c. Each cost center has a single manager to whom is
assigned total responsibility and accountability (Ref. 9).
The use of cost centers is logical in the industrial environ-
ment and provides for the accumulation of controllable costs.
Each and every order received at the shipyard is as-
signed a unique job order number. All work accomplished on
that order is then charged to the job order number to provide
for accumulation of costs and eventual customer billing.
There are three types of job order costs collected
under the NIP: (a) direct costs, (b) production overhead
costs, and (c) general and administrative costs (Ref. 8).
Direct costs are "those elements of productive costs
which can be identified without undue effort to specific job
orders assigned to accomplish a project, task, product or
service for customers, or to a process under a process cost
15

system" (Ref. 2). Direct costs, which may include labor,
labor acceleration, material, etc., are charged directly to
the job order.
Production overhead costs are those costs generated
by a cost center which cannot be charged directly to a job
order but which are incurred in support of the cost center.
The most common form of production overhead cost is that
associated with supervision. The application of the overhead
cost to the job order is done on the basis of a predetermined
overhead rate within each cost center.
General and administrative overhead costs are those
incurred in support of the activity as a whole. Palling into
this category may be the costs of management, planning depart-
ments, civilian personnel offices, etc. These costs are dis-
tributed at a rate based on the output of the entire activity,
generally per man-hour or man-day.
Accurate and reliable cost accounting is fundamental
to the proper operation of the shipyard because of the NIF re-
quirement to operate without a profit or loss. Without a
reasonable determination of costs involved in performing the
required work the shipyard could not hope, or expect, to meet
this requirement.
There are several other costs associated with the oper-
ation of the shipyard which must be accounted for but x^Jhich are




a. Unutilized and Underutilized Capacity. The
NAVCOMPT Manual provides that such costs will not be charged,
via overhead, to customers but should be budgeted for and
funded as a mobilization and reserve item (Ref. 2). In prac-
tice, this is not done. The naval shipyards maintain excess
capacity because they were built for wartime service. It is
difficult to separate, identify and quantify the costs asso-
ciated with this excess capacity and, in fact, funding to
support this capacity does not receive separate budgeting.
The end result is that some costs are passed to the customer.
b. Military Personnel. NIP customers do not pay for
military salaries, as these are paid for by the military per-
sonnel appropriations.
c. Depreciation. Although depreciation costs are
determined on the plant and equipment, they are not passed on
to NIF customers.
d. Disability Compensation Expense. This expense is
paid by the Department of Labor.
e. Rental of Building and Space. The costs of rental
from another activity or agency is not to be paid by the NIF
customer.
f. Capital Investments. Any capital investment
(greater than $1,000) must be purchased with appropriated funds




Quarterly, the following documents are submitted to
the activity group manager which is, in the case of the naval
shipyards, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 017):
a. A Statement of Financial Condition - a balance
sheet displaying assets, liabilities and fund capital.
b. Statement of Revenue and Cost - an income state-
ment which provides net operating results and other statistics
such as unfunded costs, personnel strengths and operating costs
c. Detailed Supporting Exhibits - including summaries
of costs, revenues, expenses, shipwork in progress, etc.
5. Financial Analysis
The data contained in the statement of financial con-
dition and the statement of revenue and cost may be analyzed
in a similar manner to the statements issued by any private
business. There are, however, three important elements of
analysis which deserve discussion in the case of the shipyard:
a. Fixed Price Variance (FPV)
This variance is predicated on the fact that the
customer has accepted a fixed price contract. Since the fixed
price is simply the stabilized rate times the estimated mandays
of labor, the only element which the yard can vary is the re-
quired mandays (M/D). The fixed price variance then becomes:
FPV = ( FP M/D - Actual M/D ) X ( Stabilized Rate )
18

b. Billing Variance (BV)
The billing variance arises because of differences
between actual rates and stabilized rates:
BV = ( Actual M/D) X ( Stabilized Rate - Actual Rate )
c. Gain/ (Loss) Prom Operations (G/L)
The gain or loss arises because a difference will
exist between the applied overhead rates and the actual over-
head rates
:
G/L = ( Actual M/D ) X ( Applied 0/H Rate - Actual 0/H Rate )
Given that the NIP activity objective is to attain
a zero gain/loss, the above equations indicate the critical
nature of the forecasting used in estimating manday rates and
mandays of labor required.
C. RATE STABILIZATION
"In PY 1977»..we have budgeted for 10$ ship overhauls,
but, because we are unable to budget for inflation, we are
estimating that we will be able to accomplish only 90 over-
hauls." — Secretary of the Navy, J. William Middendorf
before the House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcom-
mittee, February 10, 1976 (Ref. 6).
The statement above rather plainly displays the problems
being encountered in shipyard planning in the late sixties to
early seventies. Prior to 1976, and the implementation of rate
stabilization, shipyards were permitted to adjust their rates
on a quarterly basis to account for cost increases. Since the
customer had to budget his overhaul as much as two years before
entering the shipyard, these cost increases simply translated
into program reductions or requests to Congress for additional
19

funds, a painful process. What then were the causes behind
the changes in the shipyard rate schedules?
First, and foremost, of course was the rapidly increasing
inflation rate during this period. An industrial activity,
such as the shipyard, felt the effects of inflation rather
sharply in increased utility rates and material costs. Given
the requirement to attain a zero profit/loss condition by the
end of the year, the shipyard commander would simply adjust
his rate schedule as needed throughout the year to meet this
requirement.
The second major problem involved labor costs, which
account for approximately 50$ of the costs incurred by the
shipyard. The shipyard commander has no direct control over
wage rates paid to his employees as they are set outside the
realm of his command. In addition, he was not allowed to
budget for anticipated pay raises. In order to achieve a zero
profit/loss condition, the shipyard had to adjust their rates
with changes in the labor rates.
A third problem, which did not receive as much attention
prior to rate stabilization, was that of inefficiency within
the shipyard itself. Because their rates could be periodically
adjusted, efficiency, while of some concern, was not given top
attention. As a result, problems within the workforce and
scheduling system contributed to the increasing costs.
The three problems discussed above were major contributors
to this sensitive issue. Without a doubt, there were others.
The summation of all these factors, however, spelled a major
20

problem for the Navy. During the period FY 1971 through FY
1976, 672 overhauls were scheduled. Only 561, or 83.5% were
actually accomplished (Ref. 6). The net effect of this situ-
ation was a large number of ships, in a decreasing fleet, in
reduced material condition.
Rate stabilization was implemented at all NIF activities
during Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977* It has continued to oper-
ate as planned with only minor changes to date. Given that
rate stabilization is here to stay, at least for the fore-
seeable future, what are the advantages and disadvantages of
such a program?
1. Advantages
The first, and most important, advantage derived from
rate stabilization is the improved planning and budgeting now
available to the customer. Once a fixed price has been agreed
upon, the customer does not have to make any changes to his
planned program as the NIF corpus absorbs all price variations.
We've already seen that in the years prior to rate stabiliza-
tion only 83.5% of the scheduled overhauls were actually accom-
plished. In FY 1977, the first year after rate stabilization,
ninety overhauls were scheduled and ninety were completed
(Ref. 6). Not only does this effort improve fleet operational
readiness, it goes a long way toward easing the Navy's tarnished
image before Congress.
Of prime interest, to both the customers and the NIF
activities, is the reduced workload which should accompany the
new procedures. Because there are no rate changes during the
21

year, the required paperwork to keep the system in operation
should be reduced. In addition, requests for readjusting of
budgets should be all but eliminated.
2. Disadvantages
The loss of management flexibility in the shipyard
is probably the greatest disadvantage brought about by rate
stabilization. The original idea of the individual command
controlling its finances in such a manner as to achieve zero
profit/loss has all but been lost. This flexibility accom-
panied the command prerogative of quarterly adjusted rates to
compensate for rising costs. The shipyard now must meet its
objective with the only flexible tool remaining, that of mani-
pulation of its overhead functions.
A second, and difficult problem inherent in the new
program is the long-term planning required of the shipyard
managers. They now must estimate the effects of inflation,
utility and fuel increases, and pay raises as much as two
years into the future. Certainly that cannot be expected to
be extremely accurate, and this could result in large rate
variations between fiscal years.
Finally, the three year cycle established for rate
stabilization in the shipyards will tend to destroy some of
the management incentives previously existing. Actions taken
by the commanding officer may not be fully implemented or
evaluated during his tour of duty and will be passed on to
the next commanding officer. In a similar vein, evaluation
of the command must be looked at in a different light.
22

Previously, a key point of evaluation was how close to the
zero profit/loss objective that the command came. Since the
command may now have to incur a loss in one year to offset a
profit in the previous year, this method of evaluation has
been eliminated. In addition, the psychological aspects of
intentionally operating at a loss may have some impact on
the management of the shipyard.
Now that we have looked at rate stabilization and its
advantages and disadvantages, let us turn to the operational
factors involved with the program. In order to determine the
stabilized rate for any given fiscal year, the steps below are
followed:
a. The workload and schedule of the workload is deter-
mined in cooperation with the customer.
b. The workload, determined above, is matched to the
workforce to determine the number of direct labor mandays to
be spent on each overhaul.
c. Costs to be involved are then determined:
(1) The direct labor cost is a function of the
existing wage scales and pay raise guidance provided.
(2) Material costs are those anticipated for the
overhauls inflated in accordance with guidance provided.
(3) The overhead costs are based on the demon-
strated needs of the command.
d. The three costs above are summed and then divided
by the number of direct labor mandays determined in step two.
This calculation provides the stabilized rate per manday.
23

The stabilized rate for an overhaul which lasts
beyond one fiscal year is calculated in a similar manner. The
costs are determined as above for each fiscal period involved
and then weighted in accordance with the mandays to be worked
during that period to arrive at a final rate. This rate then
applies throughout the entire overhaul period (Ref. 6).
As we have seen already, the stabilized rate is
then utilized in each individual overhaul to determine the
fixed price which will be offered to the customer. Alterna-
tively, it is the stabilized rate which is used to calculate
the billing on a daily basis in the cost-reimbursable method.
One additional factor must be taken into consider-
ation to determine the final published stabilized rate. It is
almost a certainty that an activity cannot achieve a zero gain/
loss in operating results. To compensate for this factor, and
to attempt to bring net operating results back to zero, a pay-
back factor is applied. Past gain or loss amounts are divided
by the estimated mandays for the new year. This provides a
positive or negative payback factor which is applied to the
stabilized rates determined earlier. The intent of this pro-
cedure is to try to dampen the oscillations which can occur
from year to year. This subject will be discussed in greater
detail in the next chapter.
2h

III. ANALYSIS OF IMPACT
A. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter II, the history, size and operation of the Navy
Industrial Fund were reviewed, particularly with relation to
the eight U. S. Naval Shipyards. Rate stabilization was then
studied, including its creation and history, a discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of the program, and its oper-
ation within the shipyards.
The next step, and the main objective of this research, is
to assess the impact of rate stabilization on the shipyards.
Since the program has only been in operation for a few years,
the effects of its inception are not always clear and those
who comment on its effects are not unanimous in their comment.
The following paragraphs will describe the impact of rate sta-
bilization, first from the positive side and then from the
negative side.
B. POSITIVE IMPACT
1 . Fleet Readiness
There are several aspects of rate stabilization which
can be viewed as having a positive impact on the Navy as a
whole, on the shipyard customers or on the shipyard itself.
The most important of these, which has already been discussed,
is the improved fleet readiness brought about by this program.
The Navy can now plan and budget several years into the future
knowing that the overhauls planned will be accomplished if
funds are appropriated by the Congress. This allows Fleet
25

Commanders to plan on not only known force levels, but also
material condition of the operating ships. RADM Travers
commented on this aspect when he said,
"It permits the customer to achieve his budgeted
program which was developed in large measure based upon
certain operational committments levied on him by
national authorities" (Ref. 10).
The importance of improved fleet readiness cannot be overem-
phasized during this period when the number of active ships
is at its lowest level in many years. The improvement of the
Navy's ability to schedule and complete overhauls was a prime
mover behind the rate stabilization program and its impact
from this point of view seems to be extremely positive.
2. Stable Workload
Prior to the implementation of rate stabilization,
naval shipyards increased their prices as the cost of oper-
ating the shipyard increased. The price increases resulted
in the customer reducing his program because of his fixed
level of funding. The reduced customer program reduced the
shipyard workload which again caused unit prices to increase.
The effect on the customer, only eighty-three percent of the
scheduled overhauls completed, was of major importance to
him (Ref. 6). The negative impact on the shipyard was also
dramatic in that it resulted in an unstable workload and
fluctuating workforce. Rate stabilization, and the vastly
improved programming which accompanies it, has turned the
negative impact into a positive one. Knowing that his costs
are set once the workorder has been accepted, the customer
26

plans and executes his desired program with little or no
change. The shipyard, knowing with reasonable certainty its
future level of operations, is able to operate with a stable
workforce. The importance of this factor to the shipyard
management is dramatic. It permits adequate training programs,
improved maintenance, and, most importantly, improved morale
within the workforce.
3. Congressional Image
The combined effect of the above two changes provides
an additional benefit to the Navy as a whole. The image which
the Navy presents to the Congress has been vastly improved.
We no longer have to report incomplete programs which require
additional funding to bring to a conclusion. The Navy can
now show the Congress that the programs which are planned, and
which they have authorized, are being properly executed in a
timely manner. We can also show the effects of the improved
fleet readiness. The Congress can see that the Fleet Comman-
ders are able to carry out their assigned responsibilities,
execute training programs as needed, and have operable ships
at their command. In short, the Navy can now support itself
with respect to the overhaul programs.
L\.. Planning and Programming
The impact of rate stabilization upon planning and
programming can be looked at from two different viewpoints.
Prom the point of view of the shipyard customers, rate sta-
bilization eliminates many problems which plagued them in the
past and allows them to plan their overhauls with reasonable
27

expectancy of accomplishment. The rates which they will pay
will remain constant from the start to the finish of the over-
haul and estimates of cost growths will not be required.
Prom the point of view of the shipyards, the planning
function remains much as it had been in the past. The anti-
cipated workload is provided by the customers and the ship-
yard plans its use of resources to meet the customer f s require-
ments (Ref. 13). If any change has occurred within the ship-
yards, it f s that they should now have improved planning and
programming given the known level of customer work.
There is one important difference in the method of
planning now, however, that did not exist previously. One of
the objectives of the rate stabilization program was to allow
the Navy to achieve the budgeted program in the customer
accounts by the elimination of the many cost increases in
budgeted programs (Ref. 11). To accomplish this objective,
it is necessary to budget for cost escalation, a practice not
permitted in annual accounts. The customer can, however, bud-
get based on industrial fund rates which are allowed to include
anticipated cost escalation. This practice permits the cus-
tomer to plan his program based on realistic costs which will
not change on him during the period.
A very important aspect of the planning function for
the shipyards is their reliance on outside sources of infor-
mation. The stabilized rates are established based on a pro-
jected workload for a given year. If that workload changes
after the stabilized rates have been published, the shipyard
23

is in a position whereby they cannot possibly achieve a zero
accumulated operating result for that year (Ref. 13)» For
instance, in Fiscal Year 1978, two submarine overhauls were
withdrawn from Mare Island Naval Shipyard after the rates
were already in effect. No additional work was provided to
compensate for the change and, as a result, Mare Island gen-
erated a sizeable operating loss. The opposite effect was
seen at Norfolk and Charleston Naval Shipyards where a con-
siderable amount of extra work was provided and a healthy
profit was generated. It is critical to the shipyards, if
they are to attain a zero accumulated operating result, that
the workload provided to them for establishing their rates
not be changed or, if it is, that they be compensated for it
with additional work or cash. The major problem occurs when
work is withdrawn, yet the shipyard must continue to support
the workforce in place that was planned for the higher work-
load level. A cash balance problem, caused by a lack of pay-
ments received, is a definite possibility in this situation.
5. Improved Financial Management
Prior to implementation of rate stabilization, the
A3D(C) anticipated that rate stabilization would work to im-
prove financial management at the industrial fund activities
(Ref. 17). He viewed it as an additional tool which management
could use to more effectively operate the activities. In fact,
this has probably ocurred in some form, but is difficult to
show. The variances associated with rate stabilization, which
were discussed in an earlier chapter, are simply a few of the
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many indicators which the financial manager must recognize.
There are numerous types of variances and the effective mana-
ger must be able to isolate the factors associated with each
(Ref. 15).
Hate stabilization has provided one very positive bene-
fit in the financial management area. With the more stable
financial plan inherent in the operation of the program, the
measurement of budget execution throughout the year is simpli-
fied. It is easier to see where the dollars are going and
evaluate the use of resources against the planned program.
Since the estimated rate has now become the rate used for bil-
ling, the evaluation of labor productivity is direct.
The effect on the cost controls utilized in the ship-
yard has been negligible as a result of rate stabilization.
The cost control systems, as such, are unchanged and a cost
reimbursement system continues in use. It is now necessary,
however, for the shipyard to maintain two sets of records,
one for costs under stabilized rates and one for actual costs
(Ref. 16).
Of importance to the financial management of the ship-
yard is the efficiency of operation of the yard. With regard
to whether rate stabilization has worked to improve shipyard
efficiency, it appears to be not necessarily so. In many
respects, the rate stabilization program effects only the con-
troller. Production personnel are not mindful of the account-
ing systems and efforts to improve their efficiency would have
to be made with, or without, rate stabilization. A major
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problem which dramatically effects the control of efficiency
is that so many of the factors are outside of the control of
the shipyard commander, i.e., workload, payscales, etc.
C. NEGATIVE IMPACT
1 . Group Payback Factor
The single greatest criticism of rate stabilization,
at least from the shipyard viewpoint, is the application of
the payback factor on a group activity basis vice an indivi-
dual activity basis. The payback factor, an amount charged
each manday to attempt to bring the Accumulated Operating
Results back to a zero value, is a necessity in order to ac-
complish the objectives of the Navy Industrial Fund. The
shipyard would prefer individual payback factors so that each
yard could individually control its own operating results.
In fact, the payback factor is determined and applied activity-
wide, that is, across all eight shipyards combined. We will
look at the reasons for this mode of operation shortly.
Before looking at the impact of the group payback
factor, a quick review of its computation would be helpful.
The Accumulated Operating Results, for each shipyard or for
the program as a whole, are divided by the direct labor man-
days in the next year's program to produce a positive or neg-
ative factor. This factor is added to, or subtracted from,
the stabilized rates to arrive at the rate which will actually
be charged to the customer.
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Table II presents the payback factors arrived at for
Fiscal Year 1977 operating results. This payback factor is
applied to the Fiscal Year 1978 shipyard overhaul program.
Table III provides similar information for Fiscal Year 1978
operations applied to the Fiscal Year 1979 shipyard program.
It is important to note, in the latter case, that the payback
factors were determined and frozen thirteen months prior to
the start of Fiscal Year 1979 (Ref. 6). Also very important
to note is that a ship entering a yard keeps the same rate
throughout the entire yard period, even if that period is
greater than one year.
The individual factor column provides the amount
which each shipyard would have to charge per manday to re-
turn to a zero operating result for the year under consider-
ation. The wide range of factors calculated provides some
indication of why dissatisfaction exists with the group pay-
back factor. Shipyard H, in order to recover, must charge
$7.92 per manday. Utilizing the group payback factor, this
yard has to reduce its rates by $1|..88 and, thus, only obtains
a payback factor of $3.014.. It is a difficult situation for
the shipyard commander when he has to start the year knowing
full well that his yard will, in all likelihood, lose money
for the year.
Tables II and III also point out a reason why the
group payback factor is utilized and applied to the shipyards.
For essentially the same type of service, without rate stabil-
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per manday more for his overhaul than a customer in shipyard
A. Given that an overhaul generally lasts a year or more and
involves a tremendous number of mandays, the differences be-
tween the two shipyards could involve a significant sum of
money. It could also generate a considerable amount of dis-
satisfaction from customers who are supporting overhauls in
several shipyards simultaneously.
The factors described in the paragraphs above provide
an indication of why the shipyards have such a negative view
of the group payback factor. The shipyard commander has been
directed, under the NIF system, to perform in such a manner
that his accumulated operating results closely approximate
zero. Now, he must face the fact that the performance of all
the other shipyards affects his financial condition as much,
and possibly more, than the performance of his own shipyard.
He is placed in a position where he cannot entirely manage his
own affairs and is not at all likely to see the breakeven point
in operating results (Ref. 15K
Why is the group payback factor being used instead of
the individual payback factor? There appear to be two reasons.
First, the Department of Defense must maintain a proper image
with this program before Congress. It is much simpler to just-
ify requirements and defend the program while doing it for the
program as a whole. 3y combining all individual operating re-
sults into the group operating result there is a tendency for
the values to average out and show less change than if each
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shipyard was individually presented (Ref. 13)« In addition,
one objective of the Navy Industrial Fund is to keep the fund
solvent. At this level the big picture is more important than
the individual activities and carries more weight (Ref. 18).
A second reason for the group approach is an attempt
to keep down fluctuations from year to year (Ref. 18). Apply-
ing the group payback factor has a damping effect on the indi-
vidual activities. It is hoped that this procedure will help
to keep estimated costs close to actual costs and provide a
more steady state rate structure.
2. Loss of Flexibility
There is a significant problem inherent in the concept
of rate stabilization. In chapter II, we saw that one of the
objectives of industrial funds was to provide industrial ac-
tivities the financial authority and flexibility to utilize
their resources in an effective manner. Rate stabilization,
with its set rates, removes a large amount of that flexibility.
The shipyard commander can no longer make adjustments during
the year to minimize his profit or loss as is one of his goals
under the industrial fund concept. In order to have some con-
trol over his financial position, the commander must now mani-
pulate maintenance, training, and other functions internal to
the shipyard, a practice not utilized in the past.
Another aspect of the reduced flexibility to which we
have already alluded, is the problem which occurs when major
requirements change after the rates have already been estab-
lished. Unless the yard is compensated in some manner for
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the change, a gain or loss will occur. Prior to rate sta-
bilization, the shipyard commander could make the required
compensation via his rate structure and move toward his zero
operating result goal. Today, he cannot make that adjust-
ment and must look beyond his command to obtain assistance.
3« Loss of Initiative
It is very difficult to say what the motivational
impact of the program has been. There can be no doubt, how-
ever, that shipyard commanders and controllers see some loss
of individuality and initiative with the advent of rate sta-
bilization. After years of working toward a zero accumulated
operating result, it is extremely difficult to reorient one-
self and accept that the goal for any particular year may not
be to break even. The longer timeframes involved also make
it a distinct possibility that the shipyard commander may
never see the results of his efforts.
1|_. Workload
In chapter II, we discussed the steps, in a simplified
form, which are required to establish the rates that the ship-
yard will charge. Prior to rate stabilization, the rates were
recomputed up to three times each year, a relatively lengthy
process. The changing of rates during the year also complica-
ted the billing and reporting procedures followed by the ship-
yard. Elimination of the multiple rate changes during the
fiscal year was expected to reduce the administrative workload
required of the shipyard. This has not necessarily been the
37

case, however. The costing system within the shipyard has
not changed. What has changed is the additional paperwork
required to maintain the new program. Additional schedules
must be budgeted, rates must be published, and, in general,
there is more correspondence involved with the administra-
tion of the program at the shipyard level (Ref. 16). It is
difficult to determine whether there has been a change in
workload compared to the pre-rate stabilization period be-
cause the required effort is now in a different form.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. INTRODUCTION
This paper addressed itself to the impact which stabil-
ized rates have had upon U. S. Naval Shipyards. In order to
reach that objective, three major areas were discussed; (1
)
the Navy Industrial Fund and its operation at the naval ship-
yards, (2) the present policy of stabilized rates at the ship-
yards and (3) an analysis of the impact of rate stabilization
on the operation of the shipyards.
Prior to reaching any conclusions, it is important to note
that this program has been in operation for only three years.
Like any major new program, it met with considerable resist-
ance upon its introduction. The naval shipyards, and the Navy
in general, are still learning and growing with the program
and it may be several years before its true impact can be
understood. Close scrutiny of the program and periodic re-




The following conclusions were reached as a result of re-
search conducted in conjunction with this paper:
1
.
Rate stabilization at naval shipyards is a beneficial,
and viable, program for the Navy. Although it has some nega-
tive aspects for the individual shipyards, the tremendous over-
all operational, planning, and programming advantages that it
provides more than offset the disadvantages.
2. Rate stabilization is a program which is here to stay
for the foreseeable future. All indications are that it is
accomplishing its objectives.
3. Shipyard commanders and controllers are learning to
work with rate stabilization and the group payback factor.
Every effort must be made to cintinue to reorient the thought
processes involved from that of maximizing the individual ac-
tivity performance to that of maximizing the group performance.
ij.. Increased co-ordination among all activities involved
is required to ensure that, once workloads have been estab-
lished and the stabilized rates set, major changes in workload
at individual yards do not occur. If the requirement does
arise to change a shipyard workload, some method of compensa-
tion, positive or negative as required, should be considered.
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